found guilty on two counts of illegal placements and on one count of receiving compensation. Bess Bernard was convicted on similar grounds, while Harry Wolfson (who worked on legal papers for Slater and never handled the babies who were "placed out") was acquitted on all counts.
Unlike the Kefauver hearings-or the other famous trials and hearings of the era-the Slater case has receded into the darkest corners of the past. However, it deserves to be revisited for in its way, it, too-to borrow a term that Cold War historian Ellen Schrecker applies to the trials of Alger Hiss and the Rosenbergs-was "iconic" of an important constellation or cluster of fears and beliefs.
2 Set in the fraught landscape of adoption, it revealed how deeply this landscape-like so many aspects of life at mid-century-was infected by the paranoia and heated religious passions of the era. Deeply imbued with tensions between Catholics and Jews, it pointed to the contrasting images and roles assigned to these two religious minorities in the postwar era. In terms of Catholics, it suggested the power of the Catholic Church to shape social and political agendas as well as religious ones. As far as Jews were concerned, it revealed how antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices infiltrated both the world of adoption and the institution of justice. In so doing, no less than, say, the HUAC hearings, 3 it provided a dramatic illustration of a remark made by novelist Philip Roth. In I Married a Communist, a 1998 novel set at the time of the Cold War, Roth observed that, "Cold War paranoia had latent anti-Semitism as one of its sources."
What I have called the "iconic" nature of the trial, as well as the currents of antisemitism that swirled around it, stemmed, in great measure, from a particular dimension of Slater's practice. That is, it was not only that he "bought" and "sold" babies; rather, it was that his practice consisted of placing babies who were almost always born of Christian (and usually Catholic) mothers with parents who were invariably Jewish. This practice met an acute need on the part of his Jewish clients: that is, while Catholic babies were relatively abundant, the extremely low number of Jewish babies born out-of-wedlock-the principal source of babies available for adoption-meant that there were never enough Jewish babies to meet the demand for them. As Ellen Herman notes in a history of adoption in the U.S.: "At mid-century, authorities conceded there were simply no Jewish children to adopt. One estimate had would-be Jewish adopters outnumbering available children by a ratio of twenty-five to one." 4 And historian Barbara Melosh observes that while prospective Jewish parents might try to find a child through Jewish social services, "their quest for children rarely ended there. As members of a minority community in the United States, with a very low rate of birth out of wedlock, Jews faced formidable obstacles to adoptive parenthood. Jews were the first group to experience the extreme imbalance that would come to characterize adoption more generally." 5 For Jews, then, Slater's practice represented an enormous boon: without Slater, or someone like him, many, if not most, would not have been able to adopt at all. But if Jews welcomed his interfaith adoptions, others did not. In fact, this aspect of his practice may have done more to harm him in the eyes of judge and jury than any other. Strictly speaking, interfaith adoptions do not seem to have been illegal. While the law suggested that it was desirable to place children with co-religionists, it also contained a huge loophole: that is, it read that children should be placed with parents of their own religion "whenever practicable." But whether such placements were legal or illegal, they were clearly out of tune with the tenor of the times: amidst the fear and paranoia of the era, Americans had begun flocking to their churches in record numbers even as the country clung, perhaps more fiercely than ever before, to its identity as a "Christian" nation. As the immensely popular and influential preacher, Billy Graham, had it: "If you would be a true patriot then become a Christian."
If interfaith adoptions threatened the nation's "Christian" identity, they were also transgressive from the somewhat narrower, but even more important, viewpoint-at least in terms of Slater's trial-of adoption practices. Religion had long been central to these practices: deeming religion the "paradigmatic difference in modern adoption," Ellen Herman notes that religion was the only "factor singled out for matching by adoption laws in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century." 6 Not only did agencies seek to place babies and children with co-religionists but, also, they themselves were established along religious lines. In New York City, religious divisions were so carefully observed that a system of rotation governed whether foundlings would be given to Protestant or Catholic agencies. (Despite the fact that Jews probably constituted a third of the city's population, Jewish agencies were excluded from the system of rotation.) Thus, in departing from the adoption model endorsed by agencies, Slater's interfaith adoptions seemed to challenge nothing less than the religious foundations and assumptions long at work in the established world of adoption.
And there was still another dimension to the transgressive nature of Slater's adoptions. That is, for Catholics his adoptions did far more than depart from the "paradigmatic difference in modern adoption." On the contrary, in their eyes, Slater was doing nothing less than stealing souls from the bosom of the Church. Indeed, speaking of Catholic opposition to interfaith adoptions, Ellen Herman suggests that such adoptions may well have exacerbated long-standing tensions between Catholics and Jews. In her words, "the chronic undersupply of Jewish babies and the equally chronic over demand by Jewish adoptive couples were major factors exacerbating inter-religious tensions." 7 I am not sure that interfaith adoptions were quite as important in fueling such tensions as Herman suggests: after all, Catholics and Jews had long taken radically different positions on a host of major issues. 8 And tensions between the two groups were particularly intense in New York City where both groups vied for jobs and political power. But it is true that the Church's determination to retain its hold on Catholic babies and children was fierce. A remark made by one bishop-the "poor belong to us. We will not let them be taken from us!" 9 -might well have been altered to read: "Catholic babies belong to us. We will not let them be taken from us!" This desire was so strong that it sometimes seemed more important than the well-being of babies and children. As Dorothy M. Brown and Elizabeth McKeown observe in a book devoted to Catholic Charities, an umbrella association of Catholic organizations, although "the challenge of finding Catholic homes for children was severe, it was deemed better for Catholic children to remain in institutions than to release them to non-Catholic parents."
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The Catholic desire to keep all children within the fold may well have been the single most important factor in determining Slater's fate. It was a representative of the Church who first raised the alarm about Slater's activities and began to investigate them. Later, it was because of pressure brought by Church officials that the legendary District Attorney of Manhatten, Frank Hogan, felt he had no recourse but to pursue the case. But the Church's efforts to retain its hold on Catholic babies did not operate in a void. The pressure exerted on Hogan by Church officials would not have been effective were it not for the laws, passed just months before Slater's arrest, mandating that only parents or legal guardians had the right to "place out" children. And these laws, in turn, were the result of an impassioned campaign for adoption reform or "regulation" that was waged with increasing intensity in the years following World War II. Firmly embracing the religious guideline governing adoption, reforms incorporated it into a new model for adoption that held that parents and children should "match" as perfectly as possible. And this model, it was felt, could be put into place only by "experts" such as adoption agencies and child care professionals. Private adoptions-to say nothing of baby brokers like Slater-had to be eliminated.
THE CAMPAIGN FOR ADOPTION REFORM: THE PUBLIC, THE PRESS, AND THE PROSECUTORS
The calls for adoption reform that marked the postwar era were not, it is true, unprecedented. As Barbara Melosh observes, as early as the 1930s, reformers urged that only "experts" should decide who was "eligible" for adoption. To illustrate this point, she cites a telling passage from the first popular adoption manual, The Adopted Child, which was published in 1936. Hinting at what would become a central tenet of later reformers, it reads: "It is unwise, if not dangerous, for parents to ask a physician to find and give them a newborn infant, or to take a baby directly from the hospital in which he was born, without having him under the scientific observation of pediatricians, graduate nurses and, if need be, psychologists, for a long enough period to determine . . . whether the baby is physically sound and mentally normal." 11 Still, if child care experts and social workers had long emphasized the need for expertise in adoption-and the risks that could arise by ignoring the advice of experts-it is also true that calls for adoption reform reached a new level of stridency and urgency in the postwar period. In part, this urgency reflected the fact that there were simply more babies, and more adoptions, than ever before. Wartime social dislocations (when the husbands of married women were frequently away from home and single women found themselves on their own), as well as changing sexual mores, fueled the ranks of illegitimate babies who were often placed out for adoption. Indeed, in a New Yorker piece about the wrenching choices often faced by unwed mothers, Katherine Kinkead notes that illegitimate births peaked in 1947. 12 And, along with the increased number of available babies went a surge in adoptions. Attributing this surge (at least in part) to what she calls the "equation between parenthood and responsible citizenship that characterized the baby boom era," Ellen Herman notes that "adoptions doubled in the decade after the war to reach approximately 100,000 each year." 13 Even as adoptions surged, the role accorded the family-the social unit intimately affected by adoption-began to change. Amid the anxieties and uncertainties of the era, the family became not only the embodiment of American identity and virtue but, also, a protected havenwhat Elaine Tyler May calls a "private nest"-in which to take refuge against the "intrusions of forces outside itself." 14 And it was, I think, a ferocious and desperate desire to protect this "nest"-to ward off the dangers of "intrusions" from outside-that did more than anything else to fuel the postwar campaign for adoption reform. In this sense, the campaign resembled the well-known crusades of the era-such as those against Communist China and Soviet Russia. That is, it, too, was built on fear and wreathed in terrifying and often hallucinatory scenarios.
As the crusade took hold, and fear gained the upper hand, these scenarios began to loom larger and larger in the media. Mainstream newspapers, to say nothing of tabloids and popular magazines, featured reports warning of the dangers of unregulated adoptions. Readers learned of repentant and devastated mothers longing for babies that had been relinquished all too quickly, of ill-suited parents, of babies with physical and mental problems. A particularly frightening specterone that probably harked back to the eugenic theories that prevailed in the 1920s 15 -was that of babies who were, in the words of the era, "deficient" or "feeble minded." An article published in the New York Times in February of 1945 was typical: here, reporter Catherine Mackenzie told her readers that babies adopted privately might well turn out to be "syphilitic or feeble minded or deaf." 16 Along with the specter of "deficient" babies went still another image designed to underscore the dangers of "unregulated" adoptions. This time, it was an image that would have a profound effect on Slater's case: that of the ruthless baby broker or, as the newspapers had it, the "black market baby racketeer." Although the vast majority of private adoptions were not done for profit but, rather, by often wellintentioned doctors and lawyers, or by midwives and family friends, in the minds of reformers venal "baby sellers" embodied all the ills that accompanied the lack of regulation. Such people were a symbol of moral corruption, one more incarnation of the sinister gangsters who paraded before Kefauver and his committee and who haunted the films noirs of the era. As one reporter had it, they were "ruthless operators who cash in on the desperation of unmarried mothers and the longing of adoptive parents." 17 Newspapers pounced on each new case of alleged baby selling even as reports emphasized the staggering sums to be earned in the baby trade. One story declared that in New York City-believed to be the "biggest and busiest baby bootlegging center"-the yearly money exchange of traffic in babies is "estimated at $3,000,000." 18 The taint of criminality was such that even the kindly individuals who had often facilitated adoptions in the past were pushed into the ranks of the so-called "gray market." Their motives might be good but their lack of knowledge meant, as an article in the Herald Tribune warned, that they might unthinkingly find homes for babies who might later "turn out to have mental or physical defects, blindness, deafness or some inherited weakness." 19 Nowhere, though, was the equation between gangsters and baby brokers more explicit-or more melodramatic-than in a 1945 film produced by Monogram Pictures, a small studio known for gangster films and action thrillers. Entitled Black Market Babies, the film was inspired by a magazine article with the same title that had been published the previous year. (First published in Woman's Home Companion, the article, "Black Market Babies," was later reprinted, in condensed form, in the March 1945 issue of the widely read Reader's Digest.) Here, author Virginia Reid lamented the fact that many of the growing number of illegitimate children in America were placed out not by professional agencies but, rather, "by individuals or quack agencies at substantial profit." All too often, she argued, this gave rise to "tragic situations"-of "mothers yearning for children they have given up too quickly [and] couples sorrowing over defective children."
In the film, the "tragic situations" described by Reid give rise to the melodramatic tale of a former racketeer who, with an eye on the main chance, has become the owner of a maternity home that caters to unwed mothers. When they give birth, he sells their babies to the highest bidder. Still worse, he sells the newborn infant of his sister-in-law to an elderly couple when the baby he had promised them is born dead. He finally meets his nemesis in the character of a sympathetic and wise District Attorney who, as the film draws to a close, delivers a lecture on the need for laws to regulate adoption.
The film's message of the need for regulation was, of course, at the heart of the campaign for adoption reform. But, along with their desire for new laws, many reformers also endorsed a new, "scientific," model for adoptions to be put into place by "experts"-that is, by adoption agencies with the help of the growing cadre of professionals and experts involved in child care. Just as new security agencies could weed out the "disease" of Communism, adoption agencies could make sure that babies were as healthy as possible and, still more, that parents and children "matched" as perfectly as possible. In this process of "matching," religion-the guideline so blatantly challenged by Slater-was fundamental. But so too were other factors such as intelligence, hair and skin tone, and physical build. You could not place, for example, a swarthy looking baby with blond and blue-eyed parents. Designed to eliminate the risks involved with adoption, this new "paradigm" for adoption, to borrow a term from Ellen Herman, sought to create what she describes as a "scrupulously designed family"-one that was so "symbolically powerful" that it became a "benchmark against which all adoptions were measured." 20 There was never any proof, as Herman goes on to point out, that the "matching paradigm" resulted in superior or less risky adoptions. Nor was it particularly successful: as late as 1955 most adoptions were still done independently of agencies. But to those who clamored for reform, proof was hardly necessary. Not only did the "matching paradigm" make the use of agencies (which had the resources to test and investigate children and prospective parents) imperative, it also dovetailed with images of the ideal American family-smiling, white, homogenous-so prized at the time. In an anxious era it reassured people, as Herman writes, that the "risks" inherent in adoption could be known and "outcomes" predicted in advance. At a moment when "difference" or "otherness" (be it political, sexual, or religious) was wreathed in fear, it held out the hope that children would look like, talk like-and be like-their parents. "It is modern social thinking," explained New York Times reporter Catherine Mackenzie, "that the best place for a child to grow up is among his own people." 21 In this climate, interfaith adoptions like those effected by Slater had to be eliminated. Not only did they challenge long-standing guidelines but, also, they threatened the expertise of agencies, the "matching paradigm" and, by extension, the homogeneity, the safety, and even the purity, of the American family.
By 1949, the year of Irwin's arrest, the fears surrounding black market adoptions-as well as calls for adoption reform-had reached a kind of fever pitch. On January 31st of that year, an article in the New York Post began by announcing that the "black market in babies is now so widespread that civic and welfare leaders called today for immediate action by the State legislature to combat the boom in irregular child placements." Two weeks later, the New York Times ran a sensationalist story about a couple, both of whom were alcoholics, who had babies that they sold as a "recurrent source of income."
22 A few months later, in March, the New York Herald Tribune featured a series of articles devoted, in large measure, to the dangers posed by "irregular placements." Full of lurid details, the reports left no doubt that such dangers lurked everywhere: while some babies had been placed with parents who turned out to be "prostitutes, ex-prisoners, and psychopaths," still other babies were themselves "defective." Readers could only sympathize with the plight of one couple forced to mortgage their home to care for an adopted baby who was "mentally defective." 23 Faced with these fears, and with mounting cries for reform, the New York legislature finally took action. After years of delay, it came up with a bill designed to curb what was perceived as the black market in babies. Signed by Governor Dewey in April of 1949, it contained four principal measures: only authorized agencies could accept money for placing a child; only family members and legal guardians could place children; maternity hospitals had to be investigated before obtaining a license; all adoptions had to be reported to the State Commissioner of Health. While no one would argue that the bill ended the trade in babies, it did allow Manhattan prosecutors to build a case against Slater and his co-defendants. Barely six months after the bill was passed Slater, along with Bess Bernard and Harry Wolfson, was arrested. Two months later, on December 5, 1949, they became the first individuals indicted on charges stemming from the new law: that is, with the illegal placement of babies (they were neither family members nor legal guardians) and with receiving compensation for such placements. 24 In light of the fears and passions surrounding the issue of what was called "black market baby selling," it is hardly surprising that when Slater and the others were indicted the story made the front page of almost all of what were then New York's many newspapers. Nor is it surprising that reports about the case reflected fears of mobsters and gangs. Headlines screamed of "rackets," of "baby selling," and the "black market": "Woman, 2 Lawyers Held as Baby-Sellers" (Daily Compass), "2 Attorneys, Woman Face Baby Black Market Trial" (Brooklyn Eagle), "$100,000 Racket in Babies Holds 3" (New York Journal-American). In several cases, stories of the so-called "trio" or "black market baby ring" overshadowed features and reports bearing on the fears for national security that were also sweeping over the nation. The Daily News deemed it more important than news about the second perjury trial of Alger Hiss; The Brooklyn Eagle featured it above a story bearing on the wartime shipment of atomic secrets to the Russians; in the pages of The Daily Compass it took precedence over news about the recently passed loyalty oath.
The story told by the newspapers matched their sensationalist headlines. It was a story that, in one newspaper after another, echoed the account of the case put forth by the prosecutor in charge: assistant district attorney Ernest A. Mitler. 25 Clearly unconstrained by presentday regulations concerning what a prosecutor may say about a case to the public, or by the need for the presumption of innocence, Mitler constantly evoked the specter of gangsters. Slater's practice was not merely a "racket;" it was, declared Mitler, the "biggest racket of its kind that [he] had ever seen." As if Slater, Bernard and Wolfson were part of a syndicate of organized crime, Mitler charged that they were engaged in "a big time business done on an assembly-line basis, with Slater in charge of production, Wolfson as his office manager, and Mrs. Bernard in charge of placement and transportation of babies."
Describing the modus operandi of this "business," Miller outlined the case against Slater. He explained that Slater would begin by seeking clients in Miami-a place Mitler deemed a "mecca for unwed mothers" because it lacked regulations concerning the private placement of babies-by placing advertisements in local newspapers such as The Miami Herald and the Miami Daily News, as well as the Jewish Floridian. If expectant mothers answered these ads, and were willing to have their babies adopted, Slater would draw up a contract with them: he would pay for their living and medical costs, as well as for hospital expenses, in return for which they would turn their babies over to him once they gave birth. Once they did so, he would usually transfer the babies to nursing homes or to private individuals. Finally, for a fee that was fixed in advance, he would deliver the babies to their prospective parents, who were usually in the New York region.
Although Mitler portrayed Slater's practice as an extensive and lucrative "racket" or "big-time business," undoubtedly for legal reasons, he did not mention the detail that prosecutors would use to blacken Slater at the trial: that is, the interfaith nature of his adoptions. But, suggesting the long reach of the prosecutor's arm, this detail was mentioned in a long article, published just weeks after Slater's arrest, in which Mitler clearly had a hand. The article paid homage to the brave men in the office of the District Attorney-a homage that included photos of Mitler and of Alexander Herman, the Assistant District Attorney who would prosecute the case in court-and also featured a long interview with Mitler himself. Here, Mitler accompanied warnings about the dangers of unregulated adoptions with allusions to some of the charges against Slater.
Written by David Redstone and entitled "New York's Most Shocking Rackets," the article was published in a popular crime magazine, True Detective," given to sensationalist stories. 26 Operating on several levels, it freely mixed fact and fiction, real people and imaginary ones, even as it indicted Slater without ever mentioning him by name. The indictment emerged from a fictional tale that threaded its way through the article, featuring a small-time racketeer-a man nicknamed Homburg Harry-who had turned to selling babies. Like the film Black Market Babies, the tale explicitly conflated the figure of the gangster with that of the baby broker. But, it also did something more because, in Redstone's article, the racketeer/baby broker inevitably called Slater to mind.
Like the villain of Black Market Babies, Homburg Harry-later dubbed Little Caesar after the gangster played by E.G. Robinson in Mervyn LeRoy's famous 1930 film-follows a well-oiled and thoroughly depraved scenario in obtaining babies to sell. A clever seducer, he begins by preying on hapless young girls who find themselves lost and alone in the busy streets of New York's entertainment district. After enticing them into his web, he turns them into prostitutes and, finally, sells their babies. Describing this infernal trajectory, Redstone freely indulges his taste for purple prose even as he echoes the words Mitler used in describing Slater's case to the press. While Mitler referred to Slater's practice as a "big time business," Redstone claims that Homburg Harry was engaged in "production on a belt-line system . . . the operation beginning with fraud and deceit, followed through with statutory rape and a period of prostitution by compulsion, and ending up with a saleable unit, ready for the market-a human infant."
But Redstone did more than echo and embroider Mitler's words; he also created insistent parallels between Slater and his fictional villain. Homburg Harry shares Slater's taste in hats-Harry had a "fetish," Redstone tells us, for homburgs-as well his penchant for legalistic contracts. Most importantly, Redstone conveys the heart of the case against Slater, that is, the interfaith nature of his adoptions. Although Redstone never uses the words "Christian" or "Jewish," he does use a code word-"stock"-that leaves no doubt of what is at stake. Telling us that the foster parents for a certain child "had expressed a wish for an infant of their own racial and religious background," he explains that the doctor who handled these things for Homburg Harry, "was pleased to oblige, at a price of $1,700, well aware of the difference in stock between the mother and the foster couple."
By the time we finish the saga of Harry Homburg, we can have no doubts about his guilt-or that of Slater's. By the end of the article, the imaginary gangster and the real-life lawyer have become one and the same. By eclipsing the line between the real and the unreal Redstone tainted Slater with the misdeeds of a fictional villain. Giving this taint a still darker hue, at the conclusion of his piece Redstone evokes one last defining aspect of Slater's practice. In a luridly melodramatic scene, he describes a gang of ruthless baby sellers that, like Slater, transports babies from Miami to the New York region. "At this very moment," cautions Redstone, "a mob with headquarters in Florida is transporting pregnant girls from different cities to a so-called camp in the South, negotiating adoptions at high prices, and shipping babies by plane to purchasers up North." 27 
MISS HARNEY INVESTIGATES
Marked by a bizarre mixture of truth and fiction, "Exposing New York's Most Shocking Rackets" is revealing in several ways. Pointing to the importance that the issue of "stock" would assume once the case was heard in court, it left no doubt that Slater had been condemned in the court of public opinion well before the trial began. At the same time, it illustrated the panoply of diverse and powerful forces arrayed against Slater: the fierceness of the crusade to regulate adoptions; the role of a sensationalist press and its cozy relationship with a prosecutor's office determined to win at all costs; the terrifying image assigned to the "baby seller" in the popular imagination.
In light of all these forces, I think it is all the more striking that in all probability Slater would not have been indicted and tried were it not for the intervention of a single individual. It is here that we come to the all-important role played by the Catholic Church in obtaining a warrant for Slater's arrest-a role shadowed by antisemitic impulses and tensions between Catholics and Jews. For Slater's real nemesis was neither the press nor the prosecutor's office in New York. Rather, it was a representative of the Church: Claudia Harney, a stern-faced and determined middle-aged woman with a firm belief in authority and the law. A good Catholic, who worked as the executive secretary in charge of administration and supervision of caseworkers in the Miami bureau of Catholic Charities, Harney had every reason to want Slater apprehended and convicted. Not only was he placing Catholic babies with people of "alien" stock, but also, on a more prosaic level, he was obviously treading on her turf: after all, as Brown and McKeown write in their book on Catholic Charities, the primary mission of the organization was "anchored in child care." 28 It is difficult to overstate the important role Miss Harney played in the case. She not only prompted the investigation, she also played a crucial role as it took its course. Interestingly, the prosecutors in New York barely mentioned her contributions-it is not clear why. Did they want to take full credit for the investigation? Would her work have raised unwelcome questions? Were they loath to acknowledge the intimate relationship between the prosecutor's office and the Church, or the way in which it breached the wall between Church and State? No less interestingly, it was left to True Detective-the magazine that had articulated the critical issue of "stock"-to emphasize Harney's importance. "Through astute detective work," enthused author Paul Sherwood in the overwrought prose typical of True Detective, Claudia Harney "smashed [the] Miami-New York human cargo syndicate." 29 According to a file that Miss Harney kept about the case, and which is now among the prosecutor's papers found in the Municipal Archives in lower Manhattan, her role in smashing the "human cargo syndicate" began in a fortuitous way. 30 On June 24, 1949, an expectant mother, June Wiley (also known as June Wright and, later, as June Bell), who had promised her baby to Slater, visited the Catholic Charities agency in Miami to request that they care for her two-year old toddler while she was in the hospital giving birth. (Catholic Charities had a program for unmarried mothers that included services for mother and child.) Ignoring Slater's warning that she remain silent about the financial arrangement she had made with him, Wiley described it to the people at Catholic Charities. Moreover, she showed them the business card with Slater's name and address in New York that he had given her. Slater, she said, had explained to her that he was an attorney from New York who wanted to place her child with some "dear friends" of his.
In light of the fact that Wiley's revelations virtually launched the entire investigation, one would love to know more about the motives that impelled her behavior at Catholic Charities. Did she hope for a better arrangement from Catholic Charities? Was she angry with Slater because, as she later testified, he had threatened to "drop" her when she did not want to go to the hospital he had chosen? Or did money woes-which came through loud and clear in her testimony-fuel the resentment she obviously felt for him? But whatever factor or factors led Wiley to reveal her arrangement with Slater to the people at Catholic Charities, her words had a dramatic effect upon Miss Harney. From that moment on, enlisting the help of staff and family members, she transformed herself into a dedicated sleuth with a single, obsessive, goal: to put an end to Slater and his activities.
According to her file, Harney's detective work seems to have begun little more than a week after her initial conversation with June Wiley. For on July 1, 1949, another "client" of Catholic Charities, a woman by the name of Mrs. Helen Ryan, went to see Slater in response to the same advertisement that had caught Wiley's attention. As Wiley had done, Helen Ryan recounted her meeting with Slater to Harney. In contrast to Wiley though, Ryan said she was "shocked" when Slater suggested she relinquish her baby to him. Informing him that she planned to report the situation to Catholic Charities, she exclaimed incredulously: "You mean you want me to sell my baby!" Did Miss Harney send Helen Ryan to check out June Wiley's story? Her file is silent on this issue. But it seems likely that she did for several reasons. For one thing, the timing was suspicious; for another, since Helen Ryan was already a "client" of Catholic Charities, why did she answer Slater's ad? And why would she be "shocked" at his suggestion since the notion of adoption was implicit in the ad? But even in the unlikely case that Harney did not engineer this encounter, once June Wiley's story was confirmed, she swung into action on several fronts. Taking a step that would prove decisive, she sparked the investigation by writing a letter to the New York bureau of Catholic Charities in which she asked them to take up the case with the Manhattan District Attorney's office. At the same time, she ratcheted up her own investigation: through answering agencies she learned of other expectant mothers who were in touch with Slater; ferreted out the identity and address of Susan Stauber, Slater's secretary in Miami; and discovered an ad. that Slater had run in a weekly newspaper, The Jewish Floridian.
In the course of the summer, Harney's investigation of the case took a crucial turn: that is, she began working closely with the office of the District Attorney in New York. Neither her file nor the prosecutor's papers-which are filled with letters and telegrams from Harney, as well as Mitler's memos of telephone conversations with her-tell us exactly when or how their collaboration began. It seems likely that the Manhattan prosecutors learned of her through the office of Catholic Charities and decided to enlist her help. But however it began it is clear that by August 29-the date of a memo in which Mitler details a telephone conversation with Harney-the executive secretary of the Miami office of Catholic Charities had become, to coin a phrase, the prosecutor's woman in Miami.
Mitler could hardly have imagined a more valuable or dedicated agent. For one thing, Harney had an obsessive eye for every detaildown to the color of a baby's blanket or that of a woman's scarf-which might prove useful to the prosecution. For another, she was obviously spurred on by a sense of mission concerning the fate of Catholic babies placed with Jewish parents. Revealing her preoccupation with "stock," again and again she referred to what she perceived as "Jewish looks." Take, for example, the detailed description she gave Mitler of a scene she witnessed at the Miami airport when a baby (later identified as that of June Wiley) was transferred to its new parents (later identified as Pearl and David Feingold). Discussing the baby's new parents, she tells Mitler that the woman, "is a tall blond. Her hair looks naturally blond. She is wearing a shoulder length bob. She had it tied back with an acqua [sic] print colored kerchief . . . . She was wearing straw type shoes with heavy cork heels with red leather crossed straps. She looks like a nice looking Jewish girl. Her first name is Pearl. The man's first name is Dave. He also looks Jewish and is nice looking . . .. It 0 s possible that we'll be able to find out which baby this is."
It is doubtful that Mitler shared Harney's preoccupation with "Jewish looks" or with the religion of the adopting parents, but he clearly welcomed the information that only Harney was in a position to provide. Taking advantage of her sleuthing skills, he directed her investigation in ways that could best serve the case the prosecutors were building against Slater and his co-defendants. As he explained to her, they had decided to concentrate on cases that not only fell within their Manhattan jurisdiction but also in which they could prove that the defendants (rather than the natural or adoptive parents) had played an essential role in transferring the babies placed out for adoption. (As Mitler put it in a memo, they had to be cases in which the defendants "actually handled the physical details of the placement, and controlled the actual course of the placement.") In line with this strategy, in a letter written on October 15, Mitler urged Harney to pay particular attention to the case of June Wiley. She would be, he wrote, "a very important witness because we are, at the present moment, able to trace her child all the way through to the Feingolds [the adoptive parents]. Furthermore, her situation brings in the activities of all the participants, Slater, Stauber and Bernard."
Harney's role was so important, in fact, that at times it almost seemed as if she, rather than the prosecutors in New York, were in charge of the case. For example, characteristically taking the initiative, in one letter she counseled Mitler, to "give us more time before talking with the Feingolds. The newspapers have again promised to leave the situation alone, so we are safe on that score for the time being." In still another, she asked for the footprints and thumbprints of a particular baby so she could do a positive identification. Fully aware of her crucial role, she obviously took great pride in her sleuthing skills and in her complicity with the prosecution. At one point she told Mitler-only halfhumorously, I think-that she should sign off as the legendary detective Sam Spade. And her description of a trip to Cuba undertaken by Slater and Stauber similarly underscores how much she valued her detective skills: "If this case," she confided to Mitler, "suddenly develops an international angle I will be fascinated but whipped! Covering the Miami area is one thing, but, good as we are, we cannot also take on the Islands to the South-physically we would not endure, and linguistically, we would be utter failures. So let us all hope that this trip to the 'Pearl of the Antilles' was strictly for pleasure and that our Bess will return carrying rum, not babies." (Despite her confidence in her detective work, in this letter Harney confused Bess Bernard and Susan Stauber.)
There is no question about the personal satisfaction-if not gleethat Harney derived from her mission and her role as sleuth extraordinaire. Still, whatever the role of personal factors, her activities were, of course, part of a much broader context, that is, of Miss Harney's profound connection to the Church. For her vision of the battle in which she was engaged-as a Manichean struggle between the forces of good and evil-was clearly shaped by her religious upbringing and by her chosen profession. The daughter of Irish immigrants to America, she was both a loyal daughter of the Church and, through her work at Catholic Charities, a representative of it. Behind the zeal and the selfrighteousness that she brought to her mission one senses the looming presence of a Church that, in her day, was far more authoritarian and far less tolerant of other faiths than it is today. The obvious abhorrence that she herself felt for Slater-to say nothing of her obsessive concern with Jewish "looks"-was obviously nourished, and shared, by a Church that still deemed it a "sin" for Catholics to marry a Protestant (much less a Jew) and that established parochial schools at least in part to spare its children the dangerous company of non-Catholic boys and girls.
At the time of the Cold War, moreover, both the authoritarian bent of the Church as well as its intolerance of other religions were accompanied by a relatively new phenomenon-one that had an enormous impact on Slater's case. That is, in the Cold War era, the staunch antiCommunism of the Church-a stance that harked back to the Spanish Civil War-dovetailed with what Donald F. Crosby, S.J. describes as the "secular anti-Communism of the American political culture." As it did so, it earned for the Church a new prestige and acceptance-one that paved the way for the political ascent of Senator Joseph McCarthy as well as that of President Kennedy. In Crosby's words: "AntiCommunism had become a common denominator, the bulwark of both true Americanism and authentic Catholicism." 31 Thus, while
Jews came under a cloud of suspicion because of the taint of Communism, Catholics-by virtue of their fervent anti-Communismwere now seen as both authentic Catholics and as true American patriots. As Stephen Whitfield puts it: "A minority that had been subjected to a century of bigotry in Protestant America thus took out final citizenship papers." 32 Barely a month after Slater's arrest, Miss Harney's superior at Catholic Charities, the Reverend Paul Leo Manning, wrote a letter to the Manhattan District Attorney which testified both to the Church's new political clout and its willingness to use that clout in the secular arena. Declaring the case of "historic importance," Manning praised Mitler in effusive terms: "only a man with strong convictions regarding the sacredness and dignity of the individual," he declared, "would be so devoted to the task at hand." He then came to the point of the letter: that is, he urged Hogan to see the investigation through to the end. "Your adversary," he wrote, "is clever, shrewd, and venal. The gravity of the situation, plus the character of the opposition, makes it mandatory that you instruct your able aide [Mitler] to continue his work until success is achieved." Not to be outshone in rhetorical flourishes, in reply Hogan thanked Manning for his support and expressed his particular gratitude to "Miss Claudia Harney, for the splendid cooperation extended to us throughout the entire investigation."
Despite his gracious reply, it is difficult to know how Hogan really felt about the case or about the pressure exerted by the Church. Did he really believe the case was of "historic importance"? Or, rather, did he resent the Church's influence and the important role it played in New York City politics? How did he feel about a case that might inflame tensions between Jews and Irish Catholics in a city where such tensions were historically very high?
33 Whatever his motives, he did something that suggests that, unlike Manning and the Church, he was not keen to pursue the case. That is, he summoned Slater to his office: citing the pressure he was under on the part of Catholic Charities-apparently he had had a phone call from the archbishop-he told Slater that he would be arrested if he did not cease his practice.
If Hogan's motives remain murky, Slater's response was crystal clear. Characteristically defiant, he showed Hogan a letter from the New York State Attorney General stating that his practice was legal. When Hogan brushed the letter aside and repeated that he would be forced to prosecute him if he did not end his practice, Slater apparently used profanities as he stormed out of the prosecutor's office. Once he did so, the die was cast. True to his word, Hogan had Slater arrested. And whether or not the District Attorney felt personally insulted by Slater, once his warning was dismissed Hogan pulled out every arrow in a prosecutor's quiver: threatening and cajoling witnesses, he provided the press with incriminating leaks and clearly approved of the sensationalist description of the case Mitler gave to the press. Whatever his view of the case, he was clearly determined to prove that Slater was indeed a "ruthless operator." THE TRIAL In her authoritative study of the Cold War period, Many are the Crimes, historian Ellen Schrecker observes that the Communist trials of the era, "had an educational as well as a legal function, much of the evidence produced in them bore little relation to the alleged offense." 34 One could hardly ask for a better description of Slater's trial. True, the "alleged offenses" were not totally ignored: the prosecutors managed to prove that Slater had broken laws in placing two children and in receiving compensation for one of these placements. But these offenses were distinctly secondary: what was important, above all, was to "educate" the public about the dangers posed by private adoptions and, above all, to demonstrate the evil character of a Jewish attorney whose practice was built on placing Christian babies in Jewish homes.
Slater's task, of course, was just the reverse. Acting as his own counsel, he sought to show that, far from posing any danger, his adoptions-as he put it in his opening statement-had given children "a decent home with decent people." Challenging the prosecution to show that he had made a "single improper placement," he declared that he had done "good, decent, honorable, humanitarian work for which no apology need be offered either to you members of the jury or to the DA or to the People of the State of New York." Moreover, in addition to showing the "fitness" of his own adoptions and his adherence to long-standing norms, he wanted the trial to illuminate what he deemed the "broad sociological questions" raised by the new laws: namely, the question of fees, the role of lawyers, the approaches taken by different jurisdictions.
In fact, even before the trial began Slater twice petitioned to have the trial moved in hopes of finding a court sympathetic to hearing these questions. 35 In both petitions Slater emphasized the "novelty" of the case: not only, he argued, was it the first time that defendants would be tried under a new law but, also, this law rendered long-standing placement practices-ones that had been "approved for years"-illegal. At the same time, he outlined his vision of what the trial should or would entail. "The trial," he wrote in one petition, "itself is not and will not be a criminal trial in the traditional sense, as it will feature largely and almost exclusively testimony by surrogates, attorneys, physicians, adoption agencies, and the construction and statutory and social history of the pertinent laws and the problems of private and institutional placements and adoptions."
Once the trial began it was clear that, whatever Slater may have wanted, the prosecutors, consistently seconded by the presiding judge, Francis Valente, were determined to turn the trial into what Slater had dismissively described as a "criminal trial in the traditional sense." And they were equally determined to exclude from the trial any discussion of the broad questions that Slater had deemed essential. Valente could hardly have been more explicit: "We are not trying any sociological problems," he declared. Determined to exclude such "problems" from the trial, Valente seconded the prosecution when they objected to Slater's desire to call to the stand witnesses who might testify to the thorny question of fees: that is, were Slater's fees really different from those charged by agencies? The judge also excluded witnessesprimarily from the Brooklyn Surrogate's Court-who had approved practices similar to Slater's. Indeed, in his instructions to the jury, Valente explicitly told them to disregard any indication that other courts had approved private placements on the part of anyone other than a baby's parents-including, of course, attorneys like Slater. "In considering the guilt or innocence of the defendants," he declared, "you must not consider any evidence as to procedures followed by any Court appearing to countenance the delegation by the natural parent to an intermediary of the right to select the adoptive parent, or opinions by persons who may appear to you to sanction such procedures."
In addition to any discussion of broader issues, Valente also banished, or sought to banish, any consideration of something that one would have thought was essential to any trial about adoption: that is, the "fitness" of Slater's adoptions. Once again, Valente was absolutely explicit: in his opening remarks to the jury, he told its members that neither the "fitness" of Slater's placements nor his behavior-whether he had been kind or unkind, benevolent or cruel-could be factored into the case. Nor, he said, did it matter if the laws themselves were good or bad. Instead, he continued, the case was solely about the "law" and the "facts." Telling the jury that, "you will take the law as I give it to you," he went on to say that we are not "trying here whether the work that was done by the defendants, or that they claim they did, was laudable, commendatory, well-executed or whether it was beneficial. You are called upon here merely to decide whether what they did, if they did anything, and whatever you may find they did, was authorized by the laws of the State of New York, no more and no less."
As the case proceeded, Valente made one ruling after another in line with these opening remarks. When, for example, Slater challenged prosecuting attorney Alexander Herman to prove that he had done, "a single improper placement with unfit adopting parents," the judge cut him short with an admonition: "That is not the issue here, Mr. Slater . . . We are not concerned with the morals of the case or the good or bad qualities of the foster parents or the natural parents. We are concerned primarily with whatever what was done here constitutes a violation of law, no more and no less." And when Slater ignored the judge's repeated admonitions to avoid these issues, an angry Valente threatened him: "If you did, in fact, place children," he declared at one point, "you may have done it better than any social agency in the world. That is not the issue . . . I have instructed you on several occasions, and if I cannot impress you by virtue of my instructions, I will impress you otherwise." 36 In two appeals made after the trial, Slater charged that Valente had, in fact, been biased against him in ways that "seriously prejudiced the case." At the same time, he defended both the "fitness" of his adoptions as well as the general value of private adoptions. For example, he argued that unwed mothers often benefited from the "privacy and anonymity" inherent in private adoptions. 37 But, interestingly, he never referred-neither in his written appeals nor in remarks made in the courtroom-to the issue that seemed tailor-made to demonstrate the value of private adoptions, that is, the tremendous service he had rendered his Jewish clients. Was the issue too obvious? Too controversial? Did it seem to reinforce images of Jewish clannishness and indifference to larger social norms? Whatever his reasons, he remained silent. But if Slater refused to raise this issue, once they took the stand, his Jewish clients left no doubt about the debt they owed him. (Indeed, some of his clients were so reluctant to testify at his trial that they had to be threatened with "irregular placements" and, even, the loss of their babies.) Virtually, all spoke of the frustrating and ultimately futile attempts they had made to adopt babies in more conventional ways before coming to Slater. For one reason or another, all had been rejected by agencies: one already had an adopted child, another might still conceive, a forty-year old man was deemed too old, another was rejected because he had a heart murmur. And virtually all were clearly overjoyed with the babies they had obtained through Slater. For example, when one adoptive parent, Rose Lipsky, was pressed by prosecutors about the health problems of the infant she had adopted, and the fact that Slater had not given her any information about its background, she said simply that none of that mattered to her. "All I want is that child," she said, "nothing else." Still another witness seemed to speak for many when she said simply that Slater had brought "happiness" into her life and that of her husband.
The record does not say whether or not members of the jury were touched by the testimony of Slater's Jewish clients. Some may have been moved; others may have been totally indifferent to the joy of Jewish parents. What the record does show is that in the hands of the prosecutors their new babies became an emblem, a symbol, of the transgressive nature of Slater's practice. Unable to demonstrate that Slater's placements were "unfit," much less dangerous, the prosecutors challenged the moral integrity of the man who had facilitated them. While Slater was repeatedly reprimanded for straying from the "law" and the "facts," the prosecutors were given ample opportunity to ignore the actual charges to mount this challenge. For example, they emphasized the fact that-in contrast to agencies who investigated every corner of the lives led by prospective parents and did everything possible to ensure "matching"-Slater barely knew some of the couples who received babies. So, too, did they underscore the important role played by money-a role epitomized in the unseemly haggling that had taken place over the price to be paid for each baby.
The specter of greed was disturbing. But even this specter paled alongside what prosecutors clearly regarded as Slater's towering transgression: that is, the defiant and blatant way in which he ignored questions of "stock." It was a transgression that harked back, perhaps, to a still more ancient stereotype than that of Jewish greed: that of the blood-libel whereby Christian babies were sacrificed by Jews. It hardly hurt the prosecutors' case that Bess Bernard, if not Slater himself, had frequently lied to adopting parents: telling them what they obviously wanted to hear, she assured them that the baby they were about to adopt was, in fact, Jewish. But even aside from questions of duplicity, as the prosecutors questioned one witness after another it was clear that they considered the issue of interfaith adoptions not only central to their case but, implicitly, at the heart of the "educational function" of the trial itself.
The critical role that this issue would play throughout the trial was announced when the prosecutors questioned one of their first, and most important, witnesses: Susan Stauber. A former school teacher from New York, who was living in Miami with an adolescent son when she met Slater, Stauber served as his secretary from April of 1949 until his arrest later that year. When the case first broke, Stauber, who was clearly distraught, did everything she could to avoid testifying at the trial. Desperate to maintain her own innocence, she must have been distressed at the prospect of testifying against someone who had clearly been a good friend. So distressed, in fact, that to meet with her initially the prosecutors had to obtain a court order compelling her to come to New York. Later, to win her over, they seem to have tried blandishments-apparently members of the District Attorney's staff visited her in Miami and wooed her by taking her out to restaurants and nightclubs-before resorting to threats. Asked about these threats in the course of Slater's cross-examination of her, she replied so evasively that he finally remarked: "Did you tell me, Mrs Stauber, that unless you co-operated, the DA threatened to make you a defendant?" In the end, as a prosecutor's memo makes clear, she was not only granted immunity but promised that her expenses would be paid when she came to New York to testify.
Once on the stand, Stauber's distress at testifying was palpable. Frequently asked to raise her voice so that the court could hear her testimony, she seemed to take refuge in evasive answers and, finally, broke down in tears. But her testimony also made it clear why the prosecutors went to such lengths to obtain her cooperation. She not only knew about but had participated in the daily operations of Slater's practice. As she told the court, she had interviewed expectant mothers, given them their stipends, visited them in the hospital when they gave birth, and helped to transfer their babies to nurseries and to adopting couples. On the secretarial front, she had placed ads regarding adoption in the Miami papers and typed up prenatal agreements with birth mothers.
Even more importantly, perhaps, in addition to her intimate association with Slater's practice, she knew a great deal about the issue the prosecutors considered vital to their case: that is, the interfaith nature of Slater's adoptions. Indeed, all the agreements she had prepared for expectant mothers contained a noteworthy clause. Similar to waivers sometimes used in the case of interfaith adoptions, it was probably designed as a kind of legal safeguard to shield Slater from charges of misrepresentation or lawsuits on the part of remorseful (or mercenary) birth mothers. Bearing directly on the issue of religion, it read: "I hereby give any claims to the child up. I do not wish to appear in court. And the child shall be raised in the Hebrew religion."
If this clause sounds strange or archaic to the contemporary ear, so, too, does the language often used by the prosecutors in referring to religious issues. That is, they spoke not of "Jews" and "Christians" but, rather, favored circumlocutions such as "Jewish extraction" and "Jewish antecedents." But, unlike the term "Hebrew religion," in their emphasis on race these terms had a disturbing undertow: that is, they reinforced the idea that Jews constitute a "race" set apart from others. The unsettling resonance of these terms, as well as the general tenor of the prosecutor's questions, emerged quite clearly in two telling exchanges between Stauber and prosecuting attorney Alexander Herman. In the first of these, Herman questioned Stauber about the religion of the birth mothers whom she met. A bit later in the trial, as if the phrase "Jewish extraction" may not have been specific enough, the prosecutor began to speak of "racial antecedents." Referring to the babies placed by Slater, Herman posed the following question:
Q. You don't know whether there were a lot of these children that were not of Jewish extraction, so far as you know? A. No, I don't believe they were. Q: And you don't know whether they went to Jewish people or not, do you? A: In the adoption papers that he had me type, there was a statement that-Q: The child would be brought up in the Hebrew faith? A: That's right. Q: The representations he made to the people-about the racial antecedents of the child-you don't know of that? A: Oh, no.
Stauber probably knew more than any other witness about the religious background of all those involved in Slater's adoptions. But similar questions about "racial antecedents" were asked of virtually every witness. Birth mothers were asked if they knew their children would go to 'Hebrews'; adopting parents were asked how they felt about adopting non-Jewish children. Not surprisingly, perhaps, reactions differed dramatically. At least one Jewish couple, Jack Yanover and his wife, were so adamant in their desire for a Jewish baby that they had initially rejected one baby because it was only half-Jewish. To reassure them about the baby they eventually decided to adopt, Bess Bernard not only "swore that both of the child's parents were Jewish," but told them that it had a "Biblical name." But, unlike the Yanovers, other parents seemed relatively unconcerned, not only about the baby's religious "antecedents" but even about the fact that Bess Bernard had lied to them. While they might have preferred a Jewish baby, in the wake of numerous futile attempts to adopt previously they were delighted to have any baby. And, even if they knew that the chances for a Jewish baby were slim, they wanted to believe Bernard's assurances that their particular baby was in fact Jewish. Most importantly, perhaps, once they received their baby, joy overshadowed any resentment or anger they may have felt toward Bernard for having lied to them. This was clearly the reaction of David Feingold, the adoptive father of June Wiley's baby. Asked if Bernard had told him and his wife that their baby was Jewish, he replied simply: "It don't make any difference to us now, but she said it was [Jewish] ."
The reactions of birth mothers differed even more dramatically than did those of adopting parents. Dorothy Weinraub, probably the only Jewish birth mother to relinquish her baby to Slater, was clearly at one end of the spectrum. She was an important witness since Slater was accused-and later convicted-of having placed her baby illegally. On the stand, though, Weinraub was asked questions that bore less on these charges than on her feelings about religion. Testifying that her mother had told her to ask for a Jewish family-"she told me to say that I wanted the baby adopted by a nice Jewish family that could take care of it and give the child what it needs"-she went on to say that she herself wanted only to find a family that was "willing to take care of the baby and give it the proper care and make it happy." And her sentiments were shared by the baby's father, a hotel janitor named Jeremiah Donovan whom she later married. In fact, when Donovan was questioned about the issue of religion, he recalled that, when Slater told him about the couple eager to adopt his baby, all he asked was: "Was it responsible people, and can they afford it? And he [Slater] said, yes, that everything was all right. So I signed the papers."
Among the birth mothers who testified on this issue, the most damning testimony came, not surprisingly, from the woman whose revelations to Claudia Harney had prompted the investigation: June Wiley or Wright. (Wright was the name of a man whom she married in what she called a "false" marriage.) Like Dorothy Weinraub, Wiley was also important to the prosecution's case: in her case, it was Bess Bernard, rather than Slater, who was accused, and convicted, of having placed her baby illegally. Clearly suggesting that Slater was a manipulative liar, at both the grand jury hearing and the trial she declared that Slater had ignored her expressed wish that her baby be raised a Catholic. "I told him," she said, "I was a Catholic and the baby was Catholic and I told him I wanted the baby placed in a Catholic home. He said that would be arranged. He didn't tell me the people were Catholic, he said it would be arranged, that he knew the people personally."
It is impossible, of course, to be certain that Wiley was being untruthful or insincere. Still, given her friendship with Harney, it certainly seems likely that the two women-both of whom were hostile to Slaterdiscussed the best way to damage him on the stand. But above and beyond her friendship with Harney, Wiley's testimony raised nagging questions. For one thing, her past behavior-that is, the fact that she had two illegitimate children with a married man-suggests a certain disregard for Catholic morality. For another, if she did want the child raised as a Catholic, why did she not give it to Catholic Charities rather than to Slater? And why had she signed a document that spelled out that it would be placed with "Hebrews"? Moreover, her quarrels with Slater over money-and her anger when she found out how much he had charged the adopting parents for her baby-do nothing to allay suspicions that her testimony was inspired less by her Catholic faith than by her desire to get even with him for slights real and imagined.
The prosecutors clearly felt the need to put questions surrounding Wiley's testimony to rest. Although they did not ask about her past behavior or her friendship with Harney, they did pose two crucial questions to her: why had she given the child to Slater rather than to Catholic Charities? And why had she signed the agreement stipulating that the child would be adopted by Jews? In the case of both issues her testimony lacked credibility. For example, when asked why she had signed the agreement, Wiley declared that Slater had covered the critical clause with his hand so that she could not read it. Slater, she said "held his hand on the paper and told me to sign it. I don't know what I signed. I could have been signing Donna [her two-year old] away to him." If this response strains credulity-indeed, in the courtroom she had to demonstrate how, precisely, Slater had hidden the vital clause from her-her answer to the second question was, perhaps, even less convincing. Asked why she had not let Catholic Charities place her baby when she went to its office to see about her toddler-apparently someone at the agency had suggested she do precisely that-she replied it was because she felt "indebted" to Slater. "I didn't know which way to turn," she said, "and when I came to the Catholic Charities to take care of Donna and I told them I felt I was already too much in debt to Mr. Slater-he impressed upon me the fact that the people were spending more money than they had hoped to spend-and that's why I felt that five days after I was out of the hospital I should go back to work." Given her repeated requests to Slater for more money, one has to ask if she really felt "too much in debt" to him or if she simply wanted the money he offered?
It is difficult to think that the jurors found Wiley credible. But, in the end, perhaps her personal credibility was not important. For whether or not she herself was believable, her portrait of Slater reinforced that put forward in the press and embraced by the prosecution. Both implicitly and explicitly, she portrayed him not only as a tricky and greedy lawyer but also as a ruthless and mercenary baby seller who would stop at nothing to ferret Christian babies away from their birth mothers. However improbable it might sound, would such a man hesitate before placing his hand over an incriminating clause? And, when the jury's verdict of guilty was announced, it was clear that this image had carried the day. Found guilty, both Bess Bernard and Irwin Slater were sentenced to fines and to a year in jail. While Bernard's jail sentence was waived if she paid her fine by a certain date, Slater was not so fortunate. After two appeals, in 1953 he went to jail for four months.
(His original year-long sentence was reduced to six months on appeal and later to four months by reason of good behavior.) Even the verdict of guilty, though, did not quite put an end to the trial-or to what it represented. For Judge Valente had still to weigh in with his concluding remarks. And they could hardly have been more revealing. On a personal level, they made crystal clear the hostility for Slater that, barely repressed throughout the proceedings, prompted Valente's most authoritarian rulings. But, above and beyond their personal cast, they underscored the "educational function" at the heart of the trial: that is, the need to demonstrate, first and foremost, the dangers of "baby selling" and the venality of "baby sellers" like Slater. Making no mention of the actual charges, Valente instead did what the prosecutors had done throughout the trial, that is, he attacked Slater for what he considered the defendant's moral failingsespecially his greed. Deeming Slater's activities "a nauseating and revolting practice of trading in human flesh," he told him scathingly that there was no doubt, "that you were buying and selling babies for profit . . . Humanitarian motives, if any, were a secondary consideration. A substantial gain on each deal was the primary motive."
But if Valente's remarks pointed to the "educational function" of the trial, they were also revealing in still another way. That is, they suggested the contradictions and hypocrisy/ies at the very core of the case. For although the case gave no hint of the terrifying scenarios that surrounded baby selling in the popular imagination-there were no "deficient" babies given to unsuspecting parents, no alcoholics who produced babies for profit, no babies who lacked for love in their new homes throughout-these frightening scenarios seemed to haunt the judge's final remarks. And even though Valente himself had repeatedly declared that the "fitness" of Slater's placements did not matter, in the end he seemed to say that "fitness" was all that mattered. Ignoring the fact that Slater had indeed, as he put it, placed babies in "loving homes," Valente turned the welfare of children into the very raison d 0ê tre of the trial. "The state," he declared, "has laws to protect children and it is particularly concerned with the care of its destitute and unwanted children . . .. This practice has become common in recent years and must be stopped." And so, although no one challenged Slater's opening assertion that he had, in fact, done "humanitarian work," he had to be stopped if the state were to "protect" its children.
PAST AND PRESENT
In many ways, Slater's trial belongs to the past. It testifies to a historical moment when the Church struggled to retain its hold on Catholic babies and when children who did not "match"-or who were of a different "stock" than their parents-seemed almost as alien as the threatening creatures who appeared in science fiction films of the era. And yet, if in these respects Slater's case offers a telling snapshot of the past, it also constitutes a cautionary tale about the present. For the fears of "otherness" that prompted the "matching paradigm"-and that set the stage for Slater's conviction-continue to stalk contemporary America. And if the past teaches us about the present, then Slater's case serves to remind us of the damage caused by such fears and of the need for continuing vigilance. 35. His first request-that it be moved from the court of Special Sessions (where judges routinely dealt with misdemeanors) to the Court of General Sessions (in which juries dealt mainly with criminal matters) was granted. While the judge who ruled on his second petition-which asked that the trial be moved to the New York Supreme Court-agreed with him that these issues were important, the judge also felt that they could be addressed in the Court of General Sessions.
36. Interestingly, the moralistic and authoritarian streak that Valente displayed in Slater's trial would erupt-very publicly-a few years later in his best-known case. In a 1953 trial involving prostitution and procuring, Valente outraged New York's many newspapers by banning the press as well as the public from the courtroom. He did so, he explained, "in the interests of good morals and to curtail reporting of a trial steeped in filth." This decision gave the defense grounds for an appeal even as it became a cause c elèbre in the press. Columnist Walter Winchell declared that the case was now about a Constitutional issue entitled "Hogan and Valente versus the Free Press;" and an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune observed that "the peril is one of arbitrary judges rather than pollution by the printed word." In the eyes of New Yorker writer, A. J. Liebling, Valente's decision was nothing less than a "tyrannical judicial ukase." Even The Daily Worker weighed in on the case declaring that the people had a right to see the "exposure of capitalist morals." For an overview of press reactions to Valente's decision see A. J. Liebling, "The Wayward Press," The New Yorker, February 28, 1953, pp. 74-78. 37. Seconding this view, a recent scholar of adoption practices notes that private placements often "meant that [birth mothers] could get exactly what they needed when they needed it: money to live on, shelter, medical care, and assurances about the placement of the baby, all with no questions asked." See Rickie Sollinger, Wake Up Little Susie (New York, 2000), p. 178.
